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 Chapter 6 
 Wages in the United States: Trends, 
Explanations, and Solutions 
 Jared  Bernstein 
 Abstract  Since the late 1970s, two major developments have occurred regarding 
wages in the U.S.: the stagnation of real wages for various groups of workers and 
the increase in wage inequality. This chapter examines these trends in some detail 
and fi nds that real wages have performed better for women than men and for the 
more highly educated relative to those with less educational attainment. However, 
particularly since 2000, few groups have been spared; even workers with 4-year 
college degrees have experienced some stagnation in real hourly pay. The chapter 
examines economic theories of wage determination and fi nds that while skills often 
play a critical role in both theory and practice, other important wage determinants, 
most notably the absence of full employment—the persistently slack labor markets 
that have prevailed over the stagnation/dispersion period—are often underempha-
sized. The chapter suggests a number of policy recommendations to offset the prob-
lems of wage stagnation and increased wage inequality, including greater skill 
acquisition as well as policies to promote full employment and strengthen eroding 
labor standards. 
 Keywords  Wage trends •  Wage inequality •  Wage policy •  Economic theories • 
 Labor markets •  Unemployment •  Trade defi cits •  Minimum wage •  Unions 
 Introduction 
 This chapter  provides an in-depth look at historical  wage trends in the United States. 
Though some of the analysis goes as far back as the post-World War II years, most 
begins in the latter 1970s. This is partly a function of data availability but more of 
the analysis itself: The two major problems revealed by the analysis—the stagnation 
of real wages for various groups of workers and the increase in  wage inequality —
are most evident over the past 35 years or so. 
 My goal is not simply to show these trends but to explain their movements as 
well as discuss policy ideas targeted at both wage stagnation and dispersion. Thus, 
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the fi rst part of the chapter presents empirical trends and the second attempts to 
explain the factors driving these trends and prescribe policy solutions to improve 
them. 
 There are, of course, many determinants of both wage levels and trends, includ-
ing workers’ skills and productivity, their ability to interact productively with tech-
nology, institutional factors such as  unionization and labor laws (e.g., minimum 
wages, overtime rules), nonwage costs (e.g., employer-provided health benefi ts), 
and  macroeconomic  factors . While I touch on all the above, I fi nd the latter set of 
factors—macroeconomic ones—to be both important and often underemphasized 
in wage analysis. The extent of slack in U.S. labor markets (high levels of  unem-
ployment ) cannot be overlooked when attempting to explain widespread wage stag-
nation and dispersion, not to mention recent developments in wage trends that are 
the subject of considerable debate among both economists and the popular press. 1 
Imbalances in trade—persistent U.S.  trade defi cits —are another seldom broached 
but germane area of analysis in this space. 
 Following the empirical section, I review various  theories of wage determination 
common to contemporary economics. Some of these theories, like those that explain 
the correlation between education levels and wage levels (marginal product theory), 
have clear linkages to the data (e.g., the ever-present gradient in wage levels by 
 educational attainment ). But this theoretical review also fi nds that most theories 
assume “ equilibrium ,” or full employment, in the labor market, meaning a tight 
matchup between the number of jobs and job seekers. In fact, as noted above and 
stressed throughout, this assumption is highly unrealistic as far as the U.S. labor 
market over the past few decades—a time of stagnant and diverse wage growth. It is 
a particularly incorrect assumption in recent years. 
 The policy recommendation section that follows builds off this conspicuous 
omission in the theoretical work by incorporating the “slack problem”—the persis-
tent absence of full employment—into the analysis. This means that along with 
conventional (but still critical) policy interventions like better access to educational 
opportunities for those facing such barriers, I also suggest such interventions as 
wage targeting at the  Federal Reserve , smarter fi scal policy, direct job creation, 
improving labor standards, reducing trade defi cits, and generally speaking, reducing 
slack in the job market, which I identify as a key determinant of worker bargaining 
power, and thus, wage pressures for many in the workforce. 
1  See Janet Yellen’s speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Symposium, 
Jackson Hole, WY, August 22, 2014,  http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yel-
len20140822a.htm , and David Leonhardt, “Trying to Solve the Great Wage Slowdown,”  New York 




 Empirical Trends in Wages and Compensation in the U.S. 
 The seemingly simple question of trends in earnings is, if not complex, then multi-
faceted. Are we talking about straight wages or all-in compensation? Medians or 
averages? Annual, weekly, or hourly earnings? The fi rst concept— annual earn-
ings —invokes questions of labor supply, as in weeks worked per year and hours 
worked per week. The second— weekly earnings —invokes variation in hours per 
week. The last concept— hourly earnings —one to which I pay considerable atten-
tion to in this section, is a fundamental building block of the living standards of 
working families. 
 I also look briefl y at recent developments in labor’s share of national income, as 
this key variable has been undergoing tectonic shifts that many economists view as 
relevant to the important question of growing inequality. 
 The key fi ndings of this review of many of these trends are as follows:
•  Real wages have both become much more dispersed over time, and, for certain 
groups, also undergone long periods of stagnation. 
•  Hourly wage trends have been less favorable for men than for women, though 
hourly pay has undergone long periods of stagnation for middle- and low-wage 
women as well. 
•  Real wages across the wage scale received a clear lift during the high-pressure 
labor market of the full-employment latter 1990s. 
•  Wages by education reveal a clear and persistent gradient by attainment levels. 
However, all attainment levels, with the exception of workers with advanced col-
lege degrees but including those with four-year degrees, experienced periods of 
stagnation in the past few decades, with the largest losses among those with the 
least education. 
•  Annual earnings by percentile show extreme dispersion at the very top of the pay 
scale and stagnation among the bottom 90 %. 
•  To the extent that the data permit it, adding  employer-provided benefi ts to the 
analysis of compensation does not broadly change these fi ndings. 
•  In recent years, labor’s share of national income has signifi cantly declined. 
 Hourly Wage Percentiles 
 As noted, the hourly wage is a fundamental building block of the living standards of 
working families. When real hourly wages are rising throughout the pay scale, fami-
lies from all walks of life do not have to work more weeks or hours to get ahead and 
can thus balance family obligations with less stress. Unfortunately, hourly wage 
trends in recent decades have not been particularly favorable for most workers, and 
this in turn has required more family members to work more hours per week and 
weeks per year to raise family incomes. Mishel et al. ( 2012 ) fi nd that 86 % of the 
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increase in annual earnings for middle-income families between 1979 and 2007 was 
driven by more work, leaving only 14 % attributable to hourly wage growth. 
 Figure  6.1 shows real hourly wages at the 10th, median (50th), and 95th percen-
tiles from 1979 to 2013, indexed to 100 in 1979 so as to be able to plot them together 
given their different scales (in 2013, the 10th percentile wage was about $8.40, the 
median about $16.70, and the 95th was about $52.80). 2 
 This one simple fi gure captures many of the more important trends in real wages 
over the last 30-plus years. First, the pattern of wage inequality in the 1980s is evi-
dent as we see declining low wages, stagnant middle wages, and rising high wages. 
Next, the very important period of the latter 1990s, when  full employment labor 
markets prevailed for a few years, is evident in the acceleration of all three series. 
Third, in a point that will become more important in a later section, while middle 
and low wages diverged in the 1980s, they have since generally converged. Finally, 
wage growth stagnated again for these lower two groups starting around 2000 and 
has yet to recover. In fact, real wages for low- and mid-wage workers were dealt 
another blow in the “ Great Recession ,” although some stabilization can be seen in 
the most recent data. 
 Let us pause here and note a truly remarkable development: With the exception 
of the tight labor markets of the latter 1990s, wage earners in the bottom half of the 
wage scale have seen little, if any, real hourly wage growth over the past three 
decades. Given that the workforce has grown older, more highly educated, and more 
2  These data were provided by the Economic Policy Institute and are featured in their State of 
Working America (I coauthored nine earlier editions of this compendium and thus helped to 
develop this wage series). The data are constructed from the Current Population Survey and are 
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productive over these years only increases the degree to which these trends are both 
unusual and problematic. 
 While there are, of course, many subgroups by which to break out wage trends, 
two of the most important are  gender and education. Figures  6.2 and  6.3 are in the 
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 Fig. 6.3  Real hourly wage trends: women 
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pattern is notable in Figs.  6.2 and  6.3 , salient differences exist. First, men in the bot-
tom half of the wage scale did worse than women did. This difference is generally 
associated with the shift in labor demand from production worker jobs to service 
sector jobs—for example, from manufacturing to health care—a shift that has been 
particularly tough on non-college-educated men. 3 
 However, low-wage workers experienced stagnant (in the case of women) or 
declining (in the case of men) real hourly wages since the late 1970s. These are 
trends that have been associated with demand shifts against “less skilled” workers 
(related to but broader than the industry shifts just noted), the decline in the real 
value of the  minimum wage (a key determinant for women in the 1980s, for exam-
ple), and slack labor markets. As I discuss in the policy section, that last factor is 
particularly critical for low-wage workers, as labor market slack hurts them the 
most and full employment helps the most. 
 Weekly Earnings by Education 
 Figure  6.4 shows wage trends—in this case, real weekly earnings, by education 
level and gender, as plotted by labor economist  David Autor in a recent analysis 
(indexed to “1” in 1964). A few notable developments are apparent.
 First, not unlike the decile wage trends, real wages by education level fan out and 
have generally grown more quickly, or fallen less, for higher-skilled workers com-
pared to lower-skilled ones. This is widely interpreted to refl ect  skill-biased techno-
logical change (SBTC) . This is the idea that workers whose skills are complementary 
to new technologies that are increasingly common in the workplace can command 
an increasing wage premium. Information technology and computers are the classic 
example, and economists often invoke SBTC to explain the rising wage of college 
graduates, for example, compared those a high school graduate. 
 Though there’s surely some validity to the SBTC hypothesis, it actually provides 
only a limited explanation of the educational wage trends in Fig.  6.4 . For example, 
SBTC predicts a rising college wage premium as employers’ unmet skill demands 
bid up college wages. Yet as the part of the fi gure for men reveals, the real earnings 
of men  up to and including a bachelor’s degree generally have been fl at since 
around 2000. Similar trends appear for women, though starting later. For both gen-
ders, only those with advanced degrees (about 12 % of the workforce) have experi-
enced steadily rising wages. 
 It could be that technology-induced  skill demands have only been unmet in 
recent years for the most highly educated workers, but given that only about 12 % 
of the workforce are in this category, this would introduce a much narrower concept 
3  For example, back in 1990, 16 % of employment was in manufacturing and 7 % in health care. In 
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 Fig. 6.4  Changes in real wage levels of full-time U.S. workers by sex and education, 1963–2012 
(Reproduced from Autor  2014 ) 
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of SBTC than is generally thought to prevail. 4 Also, economists generally expect a 
gradient for skill bias, one that would distinguish the wage trends of more highly 
educated workers from those of less educated workers. But we don’t see that very 
clearly in Fig.  6.4 . Instead, other than those with advanced degrees, earnings for 
workers at all other education levels are pretty fl at since around 2000. 
 In fact, according to these data, college-educated men, who did relatively well 
compared to other males, experienced earnings growth of less than 1 % per year. For 
comparably educated women, growth was 1 % per year. The earnings of non- 
college- educated men stagnated or lost ground since the mid-1970s. 
 Annual Earnings by Wage Percentile 
 The wage data I’ve presented so far show some dimensions of the increase in wage 
inequality, such as the relative increase for high-wage workers over middle- and 
low- wage workers by decile, or the increase in relative earnings of more highly 
educated workers. But to understand the extent of wage dispersion, it is important 
to examine trends that reach the very top of the earnings distribution. Fortunately, 
annual earnings data from a high quality source—the administrative wage records 
from the Social Security Administration—provide such information. 5 
4  The 12 % is the share of workers, 18 and over, in 2013, with at least a master’s degree (data are 
from the Current Population Survey, March Supplement, graciously provided by Danilo Trisi). 
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 Figure  6.5 and Table  6.1 show the trends and levels (in 2012 dollars) from this 
series, with the fi gure starting in 1979 (and indexed to 0 in that year, thus showing 
cumulative percent growth) and the table going all the way back to the late 1940s.
 The fi gure shows the dramatic increase in earnings inequality, with especially 
outsized gains going to the top 0.1 %: Their real earnings grew by more than a factor 
of 4 over these years. The rest of the top 1 %—the 99th through 99.9th percentile—
about doubled, and below that, gains are consecutively diminished. The extreme 
cyclical movements of the top earnings trends are also notable in the fi gure. As I’ve 
shown in earlier analysis, these movements closely mimic those of equity markets 
in those years, and the correlation refl ects that these high wages include exercised 
 stock options . While many economists think of equity holdings as wealth or, if real-
ized, as income, clearly in this context they are a part of earnings. 6 
 To telegraph some of what’s coming in my efforts to explain these trends, I note 
here that it is hard to square this equity-market-driven pattern with theories of wage 
determination based on, for example, workers’ skills or their “ marginal product ” 
(their marginal contribution to the fi rm’s output), and such factors could not plausi-
bly gyrate like that (how could workers be highly skilled/productive in one quarter 
but not the next?). “Occam’s razor” would strongly suggest we rely on the simpler 
explanation: By dint of the increased importance of stock options in their earnings, 
these workers’ labor earnings have become tied to  stock market prices , introducing 
a whole new dimension of wage determinants, including bubbles, busts, corporate 
governance, and market valuations made in global markets. 
 After having gained 88 % in the fi rst few postwar decades, the annual earnings 
of the bottom 90 % grew only 17 % since 1979, from about $27,000 to close to 
6  On the Economy; “Rents, Rents, Everywhere, Rents!”, blog entry by Jared Bernstein, April 17, 
2014,  http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/rents-rents-everywhere-rents/ . 
 Table 6.1  Real annual earnings, 1947–2012 (Source: EPI analysis of Kopczuk et al.  2010 and 
Social Security Administration wage statistics [ http://www.ssa.gov/cgi-bin/netcomp.cgi ]) 
 (2012 
Dollars)  Top 0.1 % 
 Top 




90 %–95%  Bottom 90 % 
 1947  $316,878  $110,427  $49,737  $35,037  $14,392 
 1979  $569,521  $220,898  $105,519  $75,191  $27,110 
 1989  $1,275,327  $322,321  $124,773  $81,316  $27,596 
 1995  $1,349,802  $333,669  $130,993  $84,333  $27,873 
 2000  $2,492,254  $418,654  $156,163  $95,332  $31,248 
 2007  $2,633,800  $435,324  $163,927  $100,801  $31,626 
 2012  $2,488,525  $444,098  $170,540  $104,641  $31,741 
 1947–1979  80 %  100 %  112 %  115 %  88 % 
 1979–1989  124 %  46 %  18 %  8 %  2 % 
 1989–2000  95 %  30 %  25 %  17 %  13 % 
 1995–2000  85 %  25 %  19 %  13 %  12 % 
 2000–2007  6 %  4 %  5 %  6 %  1 % 
 2007–2012  −6 %  2 %  4 %  4 %  0 % 
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$32,000, or 0.5 % per year (one-fourth of the 2 % annualized growth rate for this 
wage class for 1947–79). Moreover, and this is again important to my later interpre-
tation of these trends, most of the gains of the bottom 90 % occurred in a few short 
years in the latter 1990s, when the job market was unusually tight. 
 Adding Compensation to Wages 
 One counterargument to the above observations about the bottom 90 % is that those 
data cover just the wage part of the pay package. Because workers are known to 
trade off wages for benefi ts, to what extent does the addition of employer-provided 
benefi ts—largely  health and pension coverage —change the story? 
 Though the data needed to answer that question are somewhat sparse, the answer 
appears to be “not much at all.” New analysis by Bivens et al. ( 2014 ) reveals the 
following:
•  Adding a measure of benefi ts to the hourly pay of production, nonsupervisory 
workers ( blue-collar workers in manufacturing and nonmanagers in services), 
the trend in hourly compensation is much like that of the bottom 90 % of earn-
ings from the Social Security Administration data: Real compensation doubled 
from the late 1940s to the late 1970s, and has then grown 8 % since 1979. 7 
•  The share of the workforce with employer-provided pension and health coverage 
declined since 1980: The former was down from about 50 % to 42 %, the latter, 
down from about 70 % to 52 % (these data cover only private-sector workers; 
Bivens et al.  2014 ). 
•  According to employers’ reports of their actual spending on pension and health 
benefi ts, their hourly costs for these benefi ts, infl ation adjusted, were up by less 
than 4 % since 1987, or about 0.1 % per year. And this fi gure represents the aver-
age (as opposed to, say, the median of the 20th percentile worker, whose benefi t 
provision is typically less generous). 
 In other words, there’s no evidence to support the contention that adding benefi ts 
to wages changes the trends shown thus far (though it does, of course, raise the 
levels of pay). The real compensation trend for the occupation classes of workers 
that saw less wage growth since the late 1970s is much the same as the wage trend. 
The share of workers with employer-provided health and pension benefi ts has 
diminished, and employers’ costs for those benefi ts, on average, have grown only 
slightly over time. 
7  Bivens et al. ( 2014 ) assign the average compensation package to the wage of the production, 
nonsupervisory worker. Generally, the value of benefi t packages received by such workers is below 
the average, so this adjustment may bias compensation levels up to some degree. 
J. Bernstein
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 Near-Term Wage Issues 
 This review of wage and compensation trends would be incomplete without a look 
at a wage issue that has been generating intense interest in the near-term economy 
and presents a good example of the role of economic slack in nominal wage trends. 
Though as of this writing the current economic expansion is over fi ve years old, 
wage growth, not accounting for infl ation, has been fl at at around 2 % and unrespon-
sive to what tightening has occurred in the labor market. This persistent lack of 
responsiveness of wage trends to growth has caught the attention of the Federal 
Reserve as well as the broader media. 8 Because, until recently,  consumer prices 
have also been growing around 2 %, the media have often framed the issue of stag-
nant real earnings as the recovery’s missing ingredient. 
 In order to be careful not to “cherry pick” any one wage or compensation series 
to examine this dynamic, Figure  6.6 plots the fi rst principal component of fi ve 
 different wage and compensation series. 9 This technique is commonly used to sum-
marize numerous data series in a way that pulls out their common signal, in this 
case, yearly changes in nominal growth since the early 1980s. 
 The fi ve series are:
•  Employment cost index: hourly compensation 
8  See Janet Yellen 2014:  http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140822a.htm 
and, for a media account, Leonhardt 2015:  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/18/upshot/driving-
the-obama-tax-plan-the-great-wage-slowdown.html?abt=0002&abg=1 . 
9  By “cherry picking,” I mean that given these “high frequency” quarterly data, analysts can some-
times fi nd one series that makes their particular case as far as whether wage growth is speeding up, 
























































































 Fig. 6.6  First principal component: Five series, nominal growth 
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•  Employment cost index: hourly wages 
•  Productivity series: hourly compensation 
•  Median weekly earnings, full-time workers 
•  Average hourly earnings, production, nonsupervisory workers 
 The series decelerates notably during the “Great Recession” from a peak nomi-
nal growth rate of about 4 % and stops falling when it hits about 2 % (about the rate 
of infl ation, implying stagnant earnings), where it has remained. In this regard, the 
combined series reveals little in the way of wage pressure and thus serves as a useful 
and potent confi rmation of the role of slack in wage formation. Later, I return to the 
information in this fi gure in discussing why “wage targeting” would be a useful 
policy for the Federal Reserve to adopt in its assessment of slack when setting mon-
etary policy. 
 Labor’s Share of National Income 
 Finally, a more complete understanding of current issues regarding earnings requires 
a look at a relatively recent phenomenon: the decline in the labor share of national 
income. One can think of aggregate income as generated by two “factors:”  labor and 
 capital . Thus, economists examine factor shares—the shares of national income 
attributable to each of these factors. Also relevant to this discussion is that most 
economists assumed factor shares to remain relatively constant over time, an 
assumption that is diffi cult to sustain in the face of the recent trend shown below. 
 As usual, in reality, the division of income is a lot more complicated than these 
two factors allow. We’ve already seen that realized stock options show up in earn-
ings data of the top earners. Proprietors’ income—self-employed or unincorporated 
businesses—is also ambiguous and now amounts to 9 % of national income (what 
part of the income of a physician in private practice is earnings versus profi ts?). I do 
not try to fi nesse these measurement issues here, in part because more careful work 
that does so comes up with fi ndings similar to those that follow (see, for example, 
Elsby et al.  2013 ). 
 Figure  6.7 plots aggregate compensation as a share of national income since 
1959. The pre-2007 average of this series is about 65 % (the straight line in the 
fi gure), a value around which the series has apparently wiggled since the late 1960s, 
giving rise to the widely held assumption noted above of constant factor shares. 
Since then, however, the series has declined almost 4 percentage points. The equiva-
lent of $555 billion in 2013, about $4000 per worker, has shifted from the labor 
share to the capital (or profi t) share of national income. 
 Summarizing, we see that real wages have stagnated for many in the workforce 
in recent years. While the conventional wisdom is that this unfortunate trend has 
exclusively beset only low-wage or low-skilled (i.e., less educated) workers, the 
data show otherwise. Other than a brief (but important) boost from the full- 
employment 1990s, annual earnings for the bottom 90 % of the workforce have 
J. Bernstein
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been fl at since the late 1970s. Even college graduates, specifi cally men without 
advanced degrees, have experienced fl at real earnings since around 2000. Adding in 
employer-provided benefi ts does not change the picture, and aggregating individu-
als’ wages up to national “factor shares” reveals similarly weak outcomes. Most 
recently, persistent slack in the postrecession job market has led to fl at wage growth, 
stuck at around 2 % in nominal terms, about the rate of infl ation, implying fl at aver-
age compensation in real terms. 
 In other words, the evidence clearly shows that America has a wage problem. 
The following sections present ideas as to why and what to do about it.
 Theories of Wage Formation 
 Having documented the relevant trends in the prior section, the rest of the chapter 
turns to diagnosing what’s behind wage, compensation, and labor share trends and 
prescribing policy solutions that might help to reverse or at least mitigate  wage 
stagnation and inequality. A potentially useful place to start is by briefl y reviewing 
the  economic theories of wage determination. Perhaps such theories can point to 
useful diagnostics as to what’s behind the observed trends and prescriptions regard-
ing intervention points. As with all economic theories, the real world is consider-
ably more complex and no single theory adequately explains wage formation. 
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 Fig. 6.7  Compensation as share of national income, 1959–2013 
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 A notable shortcoming of one group of theories, for example, is that they gener-
ally assume full employment: that wages are set at the intersection of supply and 
demand, either at the level of the fi rm or the macroeconomy (aggregating up across 
fi rms), at full employment. However, as I show below, full employment hasn’t been 
the norm in the U.S. labor market in recent decades. In fact, according to conven-
tional measures, the U.S. labor market has been at full employment only about 30 % 
of the time since 1980, and this absence of tight labor markets and the bargaining 
power they deliver to middle- and low-wage workers is an important explanation for 
the trends documented in part 1. Thus, I divide the discussion of  wage- determination 
theories by whether or not they assume full employment. 
 Given how wrong that assumption of full employment has been, readers may 
wonder whether theories that make such an assumption can still add value to our 
diagnosis and prescriptions. I believe so, as we will see that even theories that ignore 
the reality of labor market slack offer some useful guidance regarding other aspects 
of wage determination. 
 Theories that Assume Full Employment 
 Perhaps the dominant theory is that in a capitalist economy with “free markets,” 
people are paid their marginal product. The theory dictates that fi rms hire workers 
up to the point where their additional contribution to the fi rm’s output fails to cover 
their cost, that is, up to the point where the marginal product of the last worker hired 
is zero. To hire beyond that point would be an unnecessary cost to the fi rm; to hire 
below that point would leave money on the table as the fi rm’s technology and mar-
ket share could profi tably absorb more production. 
 While marginal product theory is obviously an abstraction—imagine a business 
of any magnitude trying to fi gure out the precise value added by its latest hire—it 
does have at least one important real world application: One of the most consistent 
fi ndings in labor economics is that more highly educated workers receive greater 
pay than those with less education do. According to Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) data, the median weekly earnings of full-time workers with a college degree 
(bachelor’s or higher) was $1,194 in 2013. For high school graduates, the compa-
rable fi gure was $651. 
 On the other hand, even a passing familiarity with U.S. wage and demographic 
trends should engender some skepticism regarding the explanatory power of mar-
ginal product theory alone, in part because it omits labor market slack and  bargain-
ing power (and the negative correlation between the two). For example, Schmitt and 
Jones ( 2012 ) show that low-wage workers are considerably older and more highly 
educated today than was the case 30 years ago, yet relative to earlier cohorts, they 
earn less. Of course, it could be the case that the skill requirements of production 
have changed in ways to lower the marginal product of today’s more highly edu-
J. Bernstein
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cated low-wage workforce but, there’s little evidence for that, and some evidence to 
the contrary. 10 
 In fact, a major fi nding of this review is that while skill enhancement through 
better educational opportunities and job training measures are, of course, essential 
factors in raising individuals’ earnings capacities, particularly for the least advan-
taged, these “supply side” factors are by no means the whole story in wage trends 
over the past few decades. Even skill acquisition that raises a worker’s marginal 
product may not necessarily boost his or her wage. In sum, there is some evidence 
for marginal product theory in the differentiation of wage levels by education, 
though less in terms of trends. Its policy implication is a sound one: better educa-
tional opportunities, especially for those facing barriers to access quality schooling. 
A shortcoming of the theory is its assumption of full employment and lack of any 
role for bargaining power or broader market failures. 
 Marginal product is a microeconomic theory in that it refers to the wage forma-
tion process at the individual or fi rm level. In what is perhaps the dominant 
 macroeconomic theory—the  neoclassical growth model , which also assumes full 
employment—aggregate productivity plays a central role in wage growth. 
 In this theory, average compensation is expected to grow at the rate of productiv-
ity, which itself is a function of the interaction of capital (e.g., equipment, struc-
tures, hardware, and software) and technology. Things that boost productivity 
growth, which could be smarter workers (a linkage to marginal product theory) or 
innovations that speed up output per hour (i.e., productivity), will raise average 
compensation. 
 While this theory has some empirical support—there are signifi cant time periods 
when average compensation grew at the rate of productivity—for our purposes it 
has numerous shortcomings. First, it is mathematically the case that when compen-
sation grows at the rate of productivity, wages and the labor share of national income 
will remain constant. However, the previous fi gure shows that in recent years, this 
has not been the case, as compensation has declined fairly sharply as a share of 
income. Second, as the prior section revealed, there is great and increasing disper-
sion of wages at different levels such that understanding movements in the average 
wage is obviously insuffi cient for our purposes. 
 The neoclassical growth model’s focus on productivity, capital investment, and 
innovation are useful reminders of the importance of these key growth factors. But 
the fact that neither of these developments—the decline in the wage share of national 
income and increased wage dispersion—are tractable within the framework (as it 
assumes constant shares and only includes average wages), not to mention the 
incorrect full employment assumption, means we will need to look elsewhere for 
theoretical guidance regarding wage formation. 
10  David Autor  2014 , in “Polanyi’s Paradox,” and others argue that technology is neutral toward 
lower-wage workers. 
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 Theories That Do Not Assume Full Employment 
 Since periods of full employment have been the exception in recent decades, it is 
very important to review theories of wage determination that do not assume away 
this critical fact. 
 In recent years, economists have been able to tap into larger and more nuanced 
datasets to build so-called  “wage curve” models that explicitly link changes in labor 
market slack. For example, a particularly timely and useful wage curve model was 
recently estimated by economists  David Blanchfl ower and  Andrew Levin ( 2013 ), 
tracking wage movements across all 50 states for the years 1990–2012, yielding 
almost 1,200 observations. Their results show strong, inverse correlations between 
slack and wage growth, implying, for example, “that a doubling of the unemploy-
ment rate is associated with a 10 % decline in real wages.” 
 Also relevant to our diagnostic analysis, Blanchfl ower and Levin fi nd that unem-
ployment is but one measure of slack inversely correlated with wage growth. Their 
wage-curve model reveals the importance of underemployment (e.g., part-time 
workers who would rather be full-timers) and “nonparticipation,” a measure that 
captures the extent to which potential workers are out of the labor force, thus con-
tributing to slack but not counted in traditional labor force measures. 
 “Search models” of wage formation are also instructive. These models start from 
the observation that unemployment is always far from zero and the matching pro-
cess of workers seeking jobs is a lot trickier than “frictionless” matches of buyers 
and sellers on stock exchanges. As Rogerson et al. point out, “there is simply no 
such thing as a centralized market where buyers and sellers of labor meet and trade 
at a single price, as assumed in classical equilibrium theory.” ( 2005 , 960). 
 In these models of wage determination, bargaining power plays an important and 
explicit role. Potential workers and employers bargain over the wage offer, with the 
parties trying to get the best deal for themselves, that is, the job seekers want to 
maximize compensation, and the employers want to maximize profi ts (and thus 
minimize compensation). How they settle the deal is a function of their “threat 
points”—essentially, outside options that give them either more or less room to 
maximize their position in the bargaining process. 
 For example, a job seeker with considerable savings has the time to drive a harder 
wage bargain on his or her own behalf relative to someone who needs a paycheck 
right away. Conversely, an employer who isn’t facing much in the way of unmet 
demand has time to “shop around” for the best worker at the lowest price (wage). 
 Some of the realities we see in the job market fi t into this model. For example, 
unemployment insurance raises the job seeker’s bargaining clout and can facilitate 
a better match from his or her perspective (more recently, analysts have suggested 
the new subsidized health insurance options from the Affordable Care Act will play 
a similar role). High unemployment strengthens employers’ hands in this bargain, 
as workers have fewer options and thus less bargaining clout. In fact, one of the key 
fi ndings of my own work in this area is that the bargaining power provided to workers 
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from full employment conditions—or missing in periods of slack—is an important 
wage determinant in contemporary U.S. labor markets. 
 A related theory is “ effi ciency wage theory ,” under which for a variety of rea-
sons, employers will adjust a certain worker’s wages above that worker’s outside 
options, given their skill level and experience. The reason for the above-market 
wage might be to increase the worker’s effort or their allegiance to the fi rm, or, to 
reduce turnover and thus avoid losing sunk costs associated with hiring and 
training. 
 The idea that paying workers more might increase their productivity (very differ-
ent from the neoclassical assumption that productivity determines the wage) and 
lower turnover costs to the fi rm has been offered as an explanation why increases in 
the minimum wage fail to trigger the predicted job losses engendered by equilib-
rium wage theory (the idea that any employer who paid a worker above the market 
wage would go out of business). In other words, higher labor costs engendered by 
the wage increase are absorbed by improved productivity. On the other hand (bar-
ring a wage fl oor), if demand is weak, workers are plentiful, and  skill demands are 
low—or skilled workers are amply supplied—fi rms may be more willing to invoke 
turnover or “shirking risk” rather than pay a higher “effi ciency” wage. 
 Before closing this brief tour, it is useful to make a fi nal stop at  “institutionalist” 
theories of wage formation . The idea here—and parts of this were sprinkled through 
all of the above—is that entrenched societal institutions, laws, and norms play a key 
role in how earnings are distributed. Moreover, these institutionally determined out-
comes have less to do with marginal product than any of the theories above would 
dictate. Unions, political power, the ideology of policy makers from Congress to the 
Federal Reserve, the setting and enforcement of labor standards (minimum wages, 
overtime rules, workplace safety),  immigration practices—all of these are large and 
determinant forces outside the narrow scope of marginal product. 
 There’s some evidence to support these more nuanced models—wage curve, 
effi ciency wages, search models, and institutionalist approaches—some of which I 
show in the next section. For example, an institutionalist framework would predict 
that international trading regimes can pit blue-collar workers in high-wage coun-
tries against those in low-wage countries, leading to wage gains in the latter at the 
expense of some classes of workers in the former. 11 Below, I show evidence from 
my own work (with Dean Baker) on wage curve analysis. And unlike many of the 
other models, the role of labor market slack in these more nuanced models leads to 
some of the policy ideas I recommend. 
 A memorable quip in economic modeling is that while all models are wrong, 
some models are useful. While many of the theories have shortcomings in the real 
world, especially the assumption of full employment, there are useful ideas in all of 
them, ideas that I pull out and suggest in the next section on policy ideas to address 
the wage challenge. 
11  Actually, standard trade theory (“Stolper/Samuelson”) makes this same prediction. 
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 Diagnosis and Prescription: What’s behind Wage Stagnation 
and Earnings Inequality and What Can Be Done 
to Reverse It? 
 The causes of the trends documented in the previous section are typically attributed 
to these factors:
 Globalization : Increased international trade, or globalization, is frequently raised in 
this context because increased trade has placed American workers in the tradable 
goods sector in competition with their counterparts from lower-wage countries, 
essentially increasing the implicit supply of labor. Of course, workers displaced 
from the tradable sector then compete with others in the nontradable sector. This 
creates the potential for greater labor market slack, particularly if, as has been the 
case in the U.S., net exports are negative (we run trade defi cits). 
 Technology  and the Need for Greater Skills in the Workforce : Those who favor this 
explanation maintain that as technology has pervaded the workplace, employers’ 
skill demands have increased to the disadvantage of those lacking such skills. 
This was discussed above under the rubric of SBTC. This explanation relates to 
marginal product theory. 
 Eroded Institutions : Reaching back to institutionalist theories of wage formation, 
others claim that the erosion of the real value of the minimum wage, union den-
sity, and labor standards has hurt many in the labor force who heretofore bene-
fi ted from the protection of these institutional forces. 
 Absence of Full Employment : As stressed throughout, labor market slack is one of 
the most important problems facing middle- and low-wage workers. The full- 
employment 1990s, for example, were the only period since the latter 1970s 
when real low and median wages rose at the rate of productivity growth. In 
recently completed research shown below by Baker and me, we fi nd solid evi-
dence that lower unemployment disproportionately raises the pay of the lowest 
paid workers and has virtually no impact on those at the top of pay scale. In other 
words, full employment’s impact on the patterns of wage growth is inequality 
reducing (Bernstein and Baker  2013 ). 
 Figure  6.8 tells an important part of this historical story. Using the Congressional 
Budget Offi ce’s estimates of the lowest unemployment rate consistent with stable 
 infl ation , it shows the percent of quarters when unemployment has been “too high” 
in the sense of being above the full employment unemployment rate. Over the 
period when real wages grew across the wage scale (see Table  6.1 above, specifi -
cally the trend from 1947 to 1979), unemployment was “too high” only 30 % of the 
time, meaning the job market was at full employment 70 % of the time. Since then, 
this share has fl ipped: unemployment has been too high 70 % of the time. And, of 
course, these are the years when wage growth was both stagnant for many and 
widely dispersed.
 Of course, full employment wasn’t the only difference between these two peri-
ods—I’ve already stressed other relevant differences, including globalization. But it 
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is one important factor. Figure  6.8 also poses a stark challenge to those wage deter-
mination theories that assume away the problem of labor market slack. 
 How important a factor is the absence of full employment? Results from 
Bernstein and Baker ( 2013 ) are presented in Fig.  6.9 , which come from panel 
regressions of all states using annual data from 1979 to 2014, shows the impact on 
wages at different percentiles from a 30 % decline in the unemployment rate (not a 
30 percentage point decline; an example of a 30 % decline would be from 7 % to 
4.9 %).
 These results show that such a decline raises real wages the most at the bottom 
of the pay scale, less than half that much at the middle of the pay scale, and not at 
all at the top. Moreover, other results from our work show a similar pattern for hours 
worked, implying that full employment boosts both hourly wages and hours worked, 
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 In considering policy interventions to address the impact of these various forces 
on wage stagnation and inequality, begin with globalization and consider the manu-
facturing wage. In real terms, the real hourly compensation of production workers 
(i.e., workers in blue-collar occupations) more than doubled from about $10 to $25 
between the late 1940s and the late 1970s (see blue line with squares in Fig.  6.10 ). 
Since then, despite productivity gains in the sector, real compensation has hardly 
changed at all (in 2013 dollars, it was about $23.50 in 1979 and $23.80 in 2013). 12 
 Economists often ascribe trade penetration to these fi gures—the fact that work-
ers in the tradable goods sector were exposed to much more global competition in 
the latter period when pay stagnated. But I think a more nuanced story is neces-
sary, one that points toward a policy solution: It’s not more trade that has hurt 
blue-collar workers in manufacturing, it’s trade  defi cits (the red line in Fig.  6.10 
with circles). Over the period when production worker wages doubled, the trade 
surplus averaged 0.5 % of GDP (1947–79); since then, the trade defi cit has been 
negative in every year, ranging from minus 0.4 % to minus 5.5 % of GDP, and 
averaging minus 2.6 %. 
 As economist  Josh Bivens has shown, when we run trade defi cits of these mag-
nitudes for that long, we are exporting large numbers of manufacturing jobs and 
12  I use the same technique as Bivens et al. ( 2014 ) to convert public manufacturing wage data for 
production workers into compensation data, i.e., I multiply the hourly wage by the ratio of National 
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signifi cantly damaging the ability of the sector to effectively grow and provide 
remunerative, high-value–added jobs for production workers. Bivens fi nds that our 
persistent trade defi cits have reduced labor demand for non-college-educated work-
ers in tradable sectors, leading to an annual earnings loss of 5.5 %, or $1,800 for 
full-time, full-year workers. 13 Of course, if diminished  labor demand in one sector 
was fully offset in another sector, our persistent trade defi cits might not be a prob-
lem. But an inherent point in Bivens’ analysis, one that ties into a theme in this 
review, is that displaced workers from one sector add to labor market slack (unem-
ployment and underemployment) in other sectors, exerting downward pressure on 
earnings for broad swaths of affected workers. 
 In other words,  globalization is a major factor in the negative wage trends shown 
above, and the pursuit of more balanced trade is one important way to help reverse 
those trends. As Bernstein and Baker argue in a  New York Times piece, 14  exchange 
rate policy is key to pursuing that balance, especially given the widely accepted fact 
that some of our trading partners, including but not solely the Chinese, place our 
manufacturers at a competitive disadvantage by suppressing the value of their 
 currencies relative to the dollar, thus making their imports cheaper in dollar terms 
and exports more expensive in foreign currency terms. We offer various policy ideas 
to push back at such  currency management , from legislation treating currency man-
agement as a violation of international trading rules that leads to offsetting tariffs to 
explicit  reciprocity arrangements . If a country wants to buy our Treasuries, we must 
be able to buy theirs (which is not always the case now). 
 Turning to  higher educational attainment , there is, of course, no question that 
more highly educated workers have, on average, higher wages and lower unemploy-
ment. At the same time, Figure  6.4 shows that real trends over time have not been 
particularly favorable, even for those with 4-year college degrees, especially men. 
 This latter point poses a challenge to skills-based explanations of wage inequal-
ity, a point that has been acknowledged even by economists closely associated with 
those explanations. David Autor, for example, argued that education-only explana-
tions for rising inequality “can suck all the air out of the conversation,” adding that 
“… all economists should be pushing back against this simplistic view.” 
 David Card , a prominent economist who has often been a skeptic of SBTC expla-
nations, as well as someone who has consistently documented the educational wage 
premium, explains the rationale behind Autor’s caveat: “I don’t think the college- to-
noncollege wage premium gives you any insight into why such a large share of the 
economic gains has accrued to such a tiny share of the population.” 15 The phenom-
13  Josh Bivens 2013. “Using Standard Models to Benchmark the Costs of Globalization for 
American Workers Without a College Degree,”  http://s3.epi.org/fi les/2013/standard-models-
benchmark-costs-globalization.pdf 
14  Jared Bernstein and Dean Baker, “Taking Aim at the Wrong Defi cit,”  New York Times, November 
6, 2013,  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/07/opinion/taking-aim-at-the-wrong-defi cit.html . 
15  Both the Card and Autor quotes are referenced here: Jared Bernstein, “Inequality’s Roots: 
Beyond Technology,” Economix,  New York Times , November 18, 2013,  http://economix.blogs.
nytimes.com/2013/11/18/inequalitys-roots-beyond-technology/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1 . 
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enon Card is describing here can be gleaned from Fig.  6.5 , showing the extent to 
which the top 0.1 % of wage earners have pulled away from the pack, including the 
rest of the top 1 % (i.e., the 99.0–99.9th percentiles). Surely, the vast majority of 
both groups are college educated, yet the differential in their wage growth rates are 
striking. Card is also referring to the deceleration of the (4-year) college wage pre-
mium (relative to the high school wage) observed in Fig.  6.4 (note how both high 
school and college weekly earnings broadly track each other since 2000). 
 These wage dynamics are most evident in Fig.  6.11 , made by labor economist 
 Larry Mishel . 16 The light blue line shows the fl attening college premium, regression- 
adjusted, against the trend in income of the top 1 % relative to that of the bottom 
90 %. The latter moves in the familiar pattern seen in Fig.  6.5 , including cyclical 
gyrations that are clearly related to stock market returns, as opposed to any skill 
differentials. In fact, it is implausible to view these varied series of the very top 
fractile incomes or earnings as related to employers’ skill demands. There’s no con-
ceivable model that would explain such cyclical movements within that 
framework.
 The key insight from the perspective of this chapter is the following: Providing 
workers with more education or  training will often translate into higher earnings. 
Encouraging and allowing such persons to achieve their intellectual, productive, 
and earnings potential must be a central goal of public policy. Moreover, higher 
educational attainment is increasingly important, because even if the education 
wage premium is not rising much, it remains highly elevated. Also, as Reeves has 
pointed out (see Chap.  13 ), educational attainment is a key mobility determinant for 
children from disadvantaged backgrounds. 
16  Working Economics (Economic Policy Institute blog), “Greg Mankiw Forgets to Offer Data for 
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 But we should also be aware that while, on average, such interventions will raise 
someone’s earnings—assuming adequate labor demand, a key issue I explore 
below—it will not render him or her immune from trends that have fl attened the 
trajectory of real wages for most education categories. 
 Furthermore, the stabilization of the  college wage premium and the decline in the 
ratio of middle- to low-wage workers challenge the SBTC theory, as its prediction 
that technology’s dissemination generates increasingly unmet skill demands pre-
dicts increased wage divergence by decile or skill level. The fact that the top 0.1 % 
have pulled so far from the pack while the wages of the bottom 90 % generally have 
stagnated is similarly inconsistent with both SBTC and simple marginal product 
stories. 17 In this regard, the education solution for rising inequality—versus basic 
wage stagnation faced by an individual—may be more limited than most advocates 
recognize. 
 In effect, the education/wage debate needs clarifi cation. On the one hand, there 
clearly exists a positive wage gradient by education level. On the other, the SBTC 
story is incomplete in that more education alone won’t solve the wage problem. It is 
not hard, however, to square these observations. On average, an individual is better 
off with more education or training, much as marginal product theory would pre-
dict. But (a) that doesn’t inoculate him or her from stagnant trends within educa-
tional classes, and (b) it doesn’t speak to the wage needs of those who are not likely 
or able to move up the education ladder. A comprehensive  wage policy agenda must 
be mindful of all of these nuances. 
 Finally, it is essential to note that increasing the earnings capacity of individual 
workers does not simply mean “fi nish college,” though that’s a laudable goal for 
many. It should also include work-based learning such as apprenticeship programs 
and on-the-job training, as articulated in a recent paper by Holzer and Lerman 
( 2014 ). These authors fi nd that such policies can provide much needed upward 
earnings mobility for many who may be less likely to benefi t from a 4-year college 
degree. 
 Reinstating the power of eroded labor market institutions is also necessary. The 
federal minimum wage remains over 20 % below its peak in the late 1960s, and 
while many states have acted independently to raise the wage fl oor, others, particu-
larly in the South, have not. The most recently introduced proposal by White House 
and Congressional Democrats is to increase the federal minimum from its current 
level of $7.25 to $10.10 in three annual increments, and then index it to infl ation. 
According to recent analysis by the  Congressional Budget Offi ce , which employs 
standard assumptions from the minimum wage literature about the impacts of the 
policy, the increase would raise the pay of 24.5 million low-wage workers, though 
17  Economists developed a “hollowing out” hypothesis to explain some of these patterns in ways 
intended to support an altered version of SBTC, but their evidence was particular to certain time 
periods and inconsistent with others. See Mishel 2013 . 
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the CBO also predicts that 500,000 jobs would be lost due the mandated increase in 
labor costs. 18 
 Policy analyst  Ross Eisenbrey ( 2014 ) provides a very useful review of a broad 
set of other important labor standards that need attention in the interest of raising 
pay for workers with limited bargaining power. His recommendations include:
•  Updating/increasing the salary threshold below which salaried workers are eli-
gible for overtime pay: This threshold—the so-called “salary test”—is not 
indexed to infl ation, meaning that unless policy makers act, nominal earnings 
growth will increasingly exempt salaried workers from time-and-a-half pay, even 
when their occupational duties mean they should be nonexempt (there is a “duties 
test” but it is less reliably applied in practice than the salary threshold). Simply 
adjusting the current threshold for infl ation based on its nominal value back in 
the mid-1970s would more than double it from $455 to about $980. 
•  Improving the enforcement of “wage and hour” rules: Incidence of “wage theft” 
(not paying workers what they are contractually owed), misclassifi cation (clas-
sifying regular employees as self-employed who are thus ineligible for minimum 
wages, overtime, and other established protections), and nonpayment of over-
time has led to signifi cant wage losses for many lower-paid workers. 
•  Leveling the playing fi eld for union organizing: Eisenbrey presents extensive 
evidence of both legal and structural changes that have tilted the balance against 
those interested in boosting the number and ability of workers to engage in col-
lective bargaining, thus blocking an essential rebalancing of bargaining power. 
Reversing this tilt requires allowing unions to organize subcontracted workers, 
crackdowns (versus “wrist slaps”) on employers who illegally block organizing 
drives, reducing waiting periods between drives and elections, and providing 
union advocates the same access to potential members that employers currently 
enjoy. 
 In addition, one of economics’ most unfortunate and unrealistic assumptions is 
that the job market is typically at full employment, barring occasional cyclical 
downturns, an assumption clearly belied by the second bar in Fig.  6.8 . Instead, in 
the interest of generating balanced and lasting real wage growth, policy makers 
must pursue full employment. This goal is particularly germane for less advantaged 
and minority communities, as even when the overall job market is at full employ-
ment, their portion of the market can still be too slack to enforce a more equitable 
distribution of wages. 
 Getting back to full employment requires fi scal and monetary stimulus, particu-
larly in periods like the recent past, where such actions are necessary to offset the 
residual weakness in the private sector stemming from the bursting of the housing 
bubble and the fi nancial crisis. Interestingly, the monetary authorities—the Federal 
18  CBO, “The Effects of a Minimum-Wage Increase on Employment and Family Income,” February 
18, 2014. The budget offi ce fi nds that 16.5 million workers benefi t directly from the increase and 
projects that another 8.5 million indirectly benefi t from “spillovers”—the tendency of employers 
to raise wages of those just above the new minimum. 
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Reserve—have in recent years quite explicitly stressed persistent labor market slack 
as a rationale for their fairly aggressive monetary stimulus. Clearly, they have been 
in the mode of weighting the full employment side of their dual mandate. 
 That said, an important idea has surfaced recently that exists right at the intersec-
tion of wage policy and monetary policy: wage targeting by the Federal Reserve. 
The central bank, particularly under Chair  Janet Yellen , is known to use a  “dash-
board” of indicators to determine slack in the economy and thus to guide its macro-
management role of balancing growth and price pressures. 19 For a variety of 
reasons—including the diffi culty assessing slack using more traditional measures 
such as unemployment (due to declines in the labor force), the “fl attening of the 
Phillips curve” (i.e., price infl ation has become less sensitive to unemployment), 
and the general stability of the Fed’s most prominent price infl ation gauge 20 —some 
analysts have suggested that tracking nominal wage trends (as summarized in 
Fig.  6.6 above) would improve the Fed’s ability to more accurately determine when 
economic pressures are building in the labor market. 
 Researchers at Goldman Sachs, for example, in an analysis that carefully tracks 
the impact on infl ation and unemployment of the various types of indicators or rules 
the Fed uses to guide interest rate policy, conclude “…that the benefi ts of focusing 
on wage infl ation are substantial when slack is diffi cult to measure and wage growth 
acts as a reliable cross check for the true amount of spare capacity” (Stehn  2014 , 1). 
Importantly, they argue that upweighting wage targeting could reduce the likelihood 
of a premature tightening of monetary policy that would throw the  economy off the 
path to full employment too soon. In the interest of both stronger recoveries and 
more broadly shared wage growth, I judge wage targeting to be an important idea 
worthy of more research. 
 Unlike  monetary policy ,  fi scal policy has been highly problematic, as Congress 
has pursued “austerity measures”—reducing budget defi cits even as output gaps 
persist. For example, various analysts found that fi scal drag reduced real GDP 
growth in 2013 by 1.5 percentage points. Conventional rules of thumb imply that 
the unemployment rate was 0.75 of a percentage point higher than it otherwise 
would have been. That amounts to over 1 million jobs, and coincidentally, about 
10 % of the actual 2013 unemployment rate, invoking real wage elasticities of the 
magnitudes in Fig.  6.9 . 
 Especially given the slack labor markets in disadvantaged communities even in 
good times, another essential policy for achieving full employment is direct  job 
creation . While the idea of direct job creation may invoke images from the 1930s of 
men in camps undertaking large public infrastructure projects, contemporary ver-
sions are quite different.  Donna Pavetti reviews a program that was effectively 
implemented as part of the Recovery Act, the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
19  “Janet Yellen’s Dashboard,” 2014, Brookings Institution,  http://www.brookings.edu/research/
interactives/2014/janet-yellens-dashboard . 
20  That is, the core personal consumption defl ator, which, as I show in my blog entry at On the 
Economy, “Price Infl ation and Wage Infl ation,”  http://jaredbernsteinblog.com/price-infl ation-and-
wage-infl ation/ , has basically moved between 1 and 2 % for over 10 years. 
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Families Emergency Fund, wherein the federal government signifi cantly subsidized 
the pay of targeted workers who found jobs in any sector (public, private, nonprofi t, 
etc.) (Pavetti  2014 ). 
 Not only did this program provide jobs for about 250,000 workers, it did so at a 
cost below that of other Recovery Act job creation measures. 21 Moreover, some 
follow-up evidence suggests that subsidized workers kept their jobs even after the 
subsidy ended. To be sure, program rules must forbid displacement (the substitution 
by employers of a subsidized worker for a nonsubsidized one) and be vigilantly 
enforced. But Pavetti ( 2014 ) convincingly argues that a scaled-up, national version 
of this direct job creation program would be a strong antidote for persistent labor 
market slack, especially for the hard to employ. 
 Conclusion 
 For much of the last 3½ decades, trends in real wages for various different groups in 
the workforce have been stagnant or worse. As shown above, this is true for middle- 
or low-wage deciles, most education levels, the bottom 90 % of annual earners, and 
even the national share of labor-based income. Adding compensation does not 
change this picture, though it does raise the level of earnings at any point in time. 
 However, those at the very top of the wage scale— at the top 1 % or even more 
so, at the top 0.1 %—and those with advanced degrees have consistently posted 
strong gains, even accounting for temporary losses associated with the business 
cycle (and the loss of equity-based earnings). Thus, two key observations that 
surface from the empirical analysis are real wage stagnation and increased wage 
inequality. 
 Theories of wage formation highlight the role of education and skills in promot-
ing higher earnings, the role of macroeconomic variables—specifi cally labor mar-
ket slack vs. tautness—the role of labor market standards and institutions, and the 
critical role of worker bargaining power. All of these factors are important if policy 
makers are to undertake measures to address the wage problems identifi ed through-
out. Research on educational premiums shows that more schooling is clearly associ-
ated with higher earnings, a fact that is already widely refl ected in policy debates. 
 On the other hand, a problem that is both more immediate and longer lasting, as 
shown in Fig.  6.8 , is the persistence of slack labor markets and its strong corollary, 
diminished bargaining power for low- and middle-wage workers. Moreover, this 
problem is generally missing from both many theories of wage determination, 
which assume full employment, as well as the broader analysis of wage trends. 
Remarkably, many policy discussions of what to do about wages assume full 
employment, which naturally elevates supply-side (versus demand-side) solutions 
like education and training. I’ve stressed throughout that these are, of course, essen-
21  Compare, for example, cost per job values in Pavetti’s Appendix Table 1 with cost per job fi gures 
discussed in this analysis. See Council of Economic Advisers  2009 , Table 4. 
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tial weapons in the fi ght against wage stagnation and inequality, but they are 
insuffi cient. 
 Full employment and robust  labor standards are equally important, perhaps even 
more so in the sense that absent ample job quantity, even skilled workers risk being 
underemployed. In that regard, I hope this review will remind policy makers that the 
most holistic approach to pushing back on stagnant and unequal wage trends is the 
best. Our interventions in this space must, of course, recognize and attack skills 
defi cits. But they must also attack trade defi cits, the absence of full employment, 
and the erosion of labor standards. Yes, this constitutes a highly comprehensive and 
challenging agenda, but that is what it will take to address the wage diffi culties that 
have been faced by most workers in the U.S. labor force for far too long. 
 Finally, there are numerous aspects of wage analysis that I left out of this analy-
sis not because they are unimportant in my judgment but because, though others 
may disagree, I view them as less central. Some labor market analysts believe that 
the pace at which technology is replacing workers has accelerated in recent years, 
with profound effects on jobs and incomes for many in the workforce. I’ve exam-
ined these arguments and found them lacking in convincing evidence, at least for 
now. But it is an issue very much worth tracking. 22 
 Though I mentioned the role of immigration in various places, I did not give this 
explanation—the increased supply of low-skilled immigration as a factor depress-
ing wages—much weight in the above analysis. There is a large literature on this 
question and the general consensus is that such supply effects have hurt the wages 
of those who are substitutes for low-wage immigrant labor while having little 
impact, or even a positive impact, on those who are complements. In the U.S. labor 
market, the latter—complements—vastly outnumber the former, though the nega-
tive impact of supply effects on the wages of, say, high-school dropouts or disadvan-
taged minorities, should not be overlooked. 
 While I focused quite closely on wage trends of various income classes, I did not 
examine issues around wage mobility (tracking cohorts of workers across time). 
Such analysis is useful but data are scarce relative to the type of information upon 
which I focused, and what evidence there is suggests little change in the pace of 
mobility over time. If that is the case, then the problems of more stagnation and 
more inequality cannot be said to be offset by greater mobility. 
 Finally, it may fairly be argued that given how “gridlocked” federal politics are 
today, few policy makers would be interested in tackling these issues. I acknowl-
edge the limits of our current political system to deal with the wage problem docu-
mented throughout, but an analysis of these political constraints is beyond the scope 
of this chapter. However, these wage challenges are not going away anytime soon, 
22  Jared Bernstein, “Before Blaming the Robots, Let’s Get the Policy Right,” Economix,  New York 
Times, February 17, 2014,  http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/17/before-blaming-the-
robots-lets-get-the-policy-right/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 ; On the Economy ; “Where’s the 
Automation in the Productivity Accounts,” blog entry by Jared Bernstein,  http://jaredbernstein-
blog.com/wheres-the-automation-in-the-productivity-accounts/ 
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and perhaps, in more cooperative times, future policy makers may fi nd the analysis 
and policy recommendations to be useful. 
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